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Newhouse: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Indiana: A Mockery Standard

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
INDIANA: A MOCKERY STANDARD
INTRODUCTION

The constitutional right to a fair trial requires that the accused
in a criminal case receive the benefit of effective assistance of counsel. 1
The basis of the constitutional right to a fair trial is the belief that
all those accused of a crime shall have their day in court.2 The accused,
a layman, should have the benefit of legal counsel in order to have
that "day in court."' A necessary corollary of this tenet is that the

1. The term "effective assistance" does not appear in the Constitution, rather
it stems from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932):
[Tihat in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an
assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the
giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
Id. at 71. Since Powell, the Supreme Court has rendered decisions which give greater
weight to the "effective representation" dictum. After Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), the right to effective assistance was imputed to all criminal cases. For more
explanation see supra note 25 and accompanying text.

For general comments on effective counsel see KRANTZ, SMITH, ROSSMAN,
(1976); Bazelon, The Defective

FROYD, HOFFMAN RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES

Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Erickson, Standards of Competency
for Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1979); Smithburn, Effective Assistance of Counsel: In Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 497 (1981); Staton, TrialAdvocate Competency, 13 IND. L. REV. 725 (1980);
Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation As a Groundfor Post-ConvictionRelief
in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 28 (1964); Note, Effectiveness of Counsel in Indiana:
An Examination of Appellate Standards, 7 IND. L. REV. 674 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Indiana Appellate Standards];Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in Transition, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 509 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel].
2. One of the foundational tenets in the American judicial system is the belief
that anyone accused of a crime or anyone seeking a legal right shall have a "day
in court." From that belief stem all other requirements of fair trial and due process.
However, without the literal "day in court," all of the other provisions and safeguards
are merely empty vessels. The accused must have a "day in court" in order to defend
his innocence and promote the ultimate goal of justice.
3. As Justice Sutherland stated in Powell 287 U.S. at 69:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompe-
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right to counsel literally means the right to effective counsel.4 To have
a day in court the accused must be adequately represented by legal
counsel' who zealously and ethically pursues the accused's best interest. Without effective counsel, the accused's day in court may be
"shocking to a universal sense of justice."6 As a result of the court's
recognizance of the right to effective counsel as a constitutional
guarantee, courts have been willing to hear claims for relief from
criminal convictions on the basis of ineffective counsel.'
In Indiana the right to effective counsel is guaranteed to those

tent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
The laymen is considered unable to understand the subtle nuances of court procedure.
As stated by Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court: "Of all of the rights that
an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." Schaefer,
Federalism and State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956). Justice Schaefer's
statement would also apply to ineffective assistance of counsel. For if counsel is inadequate, then the inadequacy necessarily impacts on counsel's ability to assert the defendant's other rights.
4. Powell, 287 U.S. 45. See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
(requiring representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases), Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (applying the right to counsel to all state criminal
proceedings). Contra Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that right to counsel
does not apply to state proceedings, overruled by Gideon).
5. One accused of a crime may waive the right to counsel and proceed pro
se. For the purposes of this note it will be assumed that no such waiver has taken
place. Also, historically, there was a distinction between counsel appointed by the court
for an indigent defendant, and counsel privately retained by the defendant. That distinction has little validity today. The United States Supreme Court recently held that
the constitutional standard for review of ineffective counsel claims is the same whether
counsel is appointed or retained. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).
6. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy - Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to our System of Justice? 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
The shock to the sense of justice can be seen when Justice Burger's three-legged stool
metaphor is used. The three legs of the stool represent the three aspects present
in trial: the judge, the prosecution and the defense. If one of the legs is short or
weak, then the stool of justice wobbles. An incompetent attorney weakens the defense
leg and wobbles the stool of justice. Id.
7. There is a rising number of claims of ineffective assistance being brought
before tribunals. Although many of these claims are frivolous and looked upon with
great suspicion, they are being heard. See Note, Indiana Appellate Standards, supra
note 1, at 707.
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accused of crimes by Article I, § 138 of the Indiana Constitution and
Sixth Amendment 9 to the United States Constitution, as incorporated
through the fourteenth amendment. 10 Indiana courts employ the
"mockery of justice" standard in reviewing claims of ineffective
counsel. Under this standard of review the attorney's actions or inactions must reduce the trial to a farce or "mockery of justice" before
relief will be granted." The Indiana Supreme Court has heard
challenges to the "mockery" standard, but has consistently refused
to alter its application of the standard claiming that it is adequate
to preserve the defendant's constitutional rights. 2 In light of the
liberalized standards evolving in other jurisdictions" and because the
8. The pertinent part of the clause is: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to . . . be heard by himself and counsel .
IND. CONST. art.
I S 13 (1976).
9. The pertinent part is: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (1976).
10. The fourteenth amendment requires that the accused in all judicial proceedings enjoy the benefit of "due process of law" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1976). The
sixth amendment is incorporated through the fourteenth amendment and is binding
on the states. Gideon 372 U.S. at 338-45.
11. Adams v. State, __ Ind. _
.
430 N.E2d 771, 773 (1982) ("the proper test of adequacy of representation by counsel, taking a totality of the circumstances
approach is the 'mockery of justice' standard, as modified by the 'adequate legal
representation' standard.").
12. Duncan v. State, 272 Ind. 614, 619, 400 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (1980) ("The
present review standard adequately insures that criminal defendants receive competent legal counsel."); Cottingham v. State, 269 Ind. 261, 264, 379 N.E.2d 984, 986, (1978)
("We are not persuaded that there is any need to change our existing standard at
this time.").
13. Standards of review for ineffective counsel have progressed from the
"mockery standard" in the federal circuits. Most circuits have replaced the "mockery
standard" with standards which implement higher requirements of performance. United
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the mockery standard to
require the customary skills and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney); United
States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975) (interpreting mockery
standard to require that an attorney must meet minimum standards of professional
responsibility), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
Other circuits expressly reject the mockery test and apply a sixth amendment approach.
Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (rejects mockery for sixth amendment approach requiring reasonably competent assistance), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945
(1980); United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (rejects mockery
for a "guidelines approach"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Cooper v. Fitzharris,
586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting mockery for sixth amendment standard of
reasonably competent and effective representation); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d
687 (6th Cir. 1974) (the proper test is a sixth amendment standard of whether counsel
is "reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance"); Moore
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United States Supreme Court has not established specific guidelines
for determining when assistance of counsel is ineffective, 4 the issue
of what standard should be used in ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in Indiana is ripe for reform.
This note discusses the history of the right and examines recent
Indiana cases involving claims of ineffective counsel. It analyzes the
rationale behind these decisions and the standard of review applied,
comparing them with the new, liberalized standards of review in other
jurisdictions. This analysis demonstrates that the "mockery of justice"
standard as applied by the Indiana Supreme Court is insufficient to
assure criminal defendants their constitutionally guaranteed right to
effective assistance of counsel and is in need of reform. Suggestions
for reform of Indiana's standard will also be introduced and discussed
in light of the need to insure the accused's right to constitutionally
effective counsel.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Assistance of counsel is guaranteed by three provisions in the
United States Constitution. It is a necessary aspect of due process
thereby making it part of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. It
is also expressly included in the sixth amendment." Effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed in the Constitution is provided in
the sixth amendment although the term "effective" does not appear
in the text." The right to effective assistance of counsel is a corollary
v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1970) (rejecting mockery for sixth amendment
standard).
Only the 2nd Circuit still applies the "mockery of justice" standard; however,
there are dissents calling for its removal. Langone v. Smith, 682 F.2d 287, 289 (2nd
Cir. 1982) (en banc) (Oaks, J., dissenting) (calling for an abandonment of the "contentless,
outmoded farce and mockery" rule).
14. The standard set out by the United States Supreme Court is the "range
of competence" standard of McMann, 397 U.S. 759. It is a broad generalized standard
which contains no specific guidelines in aiding the lower courts.
15. Assistance of counsel is a necessity to perfect due process of law. Therefore,
assistance of counsel is included in the fifth amendment and the due process clause.
Assistance of counsel in criminal trials is a specific clause in the sixth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment incorporates both amendments and makes them binding
on the states. Therefore, assistance of counsel is guaranteed to those accused of crimes
in state courts by three amendments of the United States Constitution.
16. The term "effective" was first implicitly incorporated in the sixth amendment in Powell, 287 U.S. 45. It is now firmly established as a right protected by the
sixth amendment. "It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right
to effective assistance of counsel." McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14.
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to the basic sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel as
established in Powell v. Alabama.7 In Powell, the Court determined
that an ambiguous appointment of counsel" precluded "the giving of
effective aid" and resulted in a denial of due process. 9 Consequently,
the right to effective assistance of counsel was initially viewed as a
minimal due process right. Moreover, subsequent cases dealt with the
effectiveness of counsel issue as an element of fair trial in accordance
with due process."0
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have held that the right to
effective assistance of counsel is a substantive right and not merely
an aspect of due process." In Glasser v. United States,' the Court
held that the appointment of counsel to defend co-defendants with
potentially inconsistent defenses denied the defendants the "right to
have the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment."23 However, it was not until Gideon v. Wainwright"' that
the right to effective counsel was imputed to criminal defendants in
state courts.2 Gideon incorporated this aspect of the sixth amendment
through the fourteenth amendment making it applicable to the states.2
The corollary right to effective assistance of counsel was therefore
implicitly included and also binding upon the states. Moreover, the
Gideon decision made the right to effective assistance a substantive
17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
18. Powell, is the famous case of the "Scotsboro boys." Indicted in a hostile
southern community the group of black youths, accused of raping two white girls,
pleaded not guilty. Before the trial, the court appointed "all the members of the bar,"
id. at 49, to represent the defendants at the arraignment. It was not until a few moments
before the trial that an attorney accepted any responsibility for defending the youths.
Id. at 58. The Court held that the appearance was merely pro forma ("in form only")
and that the defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial
sense. Id.
19. Id. at 71.
20. In Betts, 316 U.S. 455, the Court refused to apply the sixth amendment
through the due process clause to state prosecution. Moreover, the Court stated that
the "less rigid and more fluid" concepts of due process were more applicable to such
cases. Id. at 462.
21. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (when joint representation
is ineffective it denies the sixth amendment guarantees); Von Moltke v. Giles, 332
U.S. 708, 732 (1948) (duty to appoint counsel is not a procedural formality) Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (effective assistance of counsel is"guaranteed
by the sixth amendment").
22. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
23. Id. at 76.
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. Gideon emphasized the importance of the right to counsel as a sixth amendment right and expressly overruled Betts. Id. at 343.
26. Id.
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right rather than an aspect of due process by incorporating the sixth
amendment into the fourteenth amendment.27
Mockery Standard
Since the United States Supreme Court has recognized the right
to effective assistance of counsel as a substantive right but has not
established the parameters of what constitutes ineffectiveness, the
lower courts have developed standards which attempt to review the
right to effective assistance of counsel. The initial test was devised
by the District of Columbia Circuit in Diggs v. Welch. 8 The standard
derived from Diggs is the "mockery" test which applies a due process
analysis.' Decided after Powell, Diggs held that when there was a
proper appointment of counsel, the defendant was not deprived of his
sixth amendment rights regardless of the attorney's actions.' Furthermore, the Diggs court held that the defendant must rely on the due
process clause when challenging the effectiveness of counsel." Even
though the holding contradicts Powell,32 the Diggs court stated that
once a proper appointment of counsel was made, the accused's right
to counsel was satisfied.' The court then declared that the test for
ineffective assistance of counsel was whether "the circumstances surrounding the trial shocked the conscience of the court and made the
proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice."34'
Reasonably Competent Standard
The federal circuits soon adopted the "mockery" standard" and
27. Effective assistance of counsel still remains an essential aspect of due
process. However, it now is a substantive right in its own force through the sixth
amendment and, therefore, must be scrutinized by means of a sixth amendment test.
See generally, Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 1.
28. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
29. Id. at 669. The court required the defendant to rely on the due process
clause which guarantees the accused a fair trial. It recognized that the attorney's incompetency may contribute to a lack of due process but refused to examine the quality of the attorney's actions. Rather, the court looked to the trial as a whole.
30. Id. at 668.
31. Id. at 669.
32. The position stated in Powell, that formal appointment of counsel is insufficient in itself to satisfy the sixth amendment, was reaffirmed in Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444 (1940). The sixth amendment guarantees "due appointment of counsel
which cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment." Id. at 446.
33. Diggs, 148 F.2d at 668.
34. Id. at 670.
35. The "mockery of justice" standard employed by the circuit courts typically required that the actions of counsel turn the trial into a "farce," "sham," "mockery,"
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adhered to its approach until the Supreme Court decided McMann
v. Richardson." In McMann, the Court stated that there must be
"reasonably competent advice,"37 and that the attorney's actions must
be "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases."38 The dicta of McMann suggests a stricter scrutiny of ineffective assistance claims than under the "mockery" test. The circuit
courts then devised standards of review for ineffective assistance
claims which employed a stricter sixth amendment examination rather
than the due process analysis of the "mockery" standard. 9 However,
the Supreme Court has not expressly defined what constitutes ineffective assistance." Consequently, the standards devised by the circuit courts, while attempting to satisfy the McMann dicta, are in
disarray 1 and create disparities in the minimum level of representation demanded by the sixth amendment.
INDIANA'S STANDARD OF
REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

The Indiana Supreme Court employs the "mockery of justice"
standard in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This
standard places a heavy burden on a defendant seeking to reverse
a criminal conviction.42 The defendant labors under a presumption that
defendant's counsel performed his tasks adequately.'3 That presumpor "travesty of justice," shocking the conscience of the court. See Williams v. Beto,
354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Fround v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th
Cir. 1962); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961); Cofield v. United
States, 263 F2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Wright, 176 F.2d 376, 379
(2nd Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948).
36. 397 U.S. 759.
37. Id. at 770.
38. Id. at 771.
39. See infra notes 170-75.
40. The Supreme Court has heard petitions to resolve what constitute the
minimum standard of competence required to satisfy the sixth amendment and refused to grant certiorari.In Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978), Justices White
and Rehnquist authored a strong dissent to a denial of certiorari:
[In the last analysis, it is this Court's responsibility to determine what
level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows
that we should attempt to eliminate disparities in the minimum quality
of representation required to be provided to indigent defendants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly frames the issue that has divided
the Courts of Appeals, the Court shirks its central responsibility as the
court of last resort . ...
Id. at 1012-13.
41. Id. at 1011.
42. Duncan, 272 Ind. at 614, 400 N.E.2d at 1113.
43. See, e.g., Adams, Ind. at __,
430 N.E.2d at 773; Cowell v, State,
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tion can be overcome only by "strong and convincing evidence." 4 The
evidence must show that what counsel did or failed to do reduced
the trial to a "farce," or "mockery of justice" that is "shocking to
the conscience of the court."4 In examining the evidence, the court
will not use the benefit of hindsight nor will it second guess counsel's
strategy or tactical choices. 41 Under this standard, defense counsel's
errors in judgment due to inexperience4 7 or honest rmistakes in judgment do not amount to ineffectiveness." Further, a conviction is not
considered tantamount to ineffective counsel.'9 Instead, the court, in
reviewing the claim of ineffective assistance, will look to the totality
of circumstances surrounding the trial, and will judge the trial as a
whole."
416 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1981); Hollon v. State, 272 Ind. 439, 444,

Id__
nd .....

398 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (1980); Merida v. State, 270 Ind. 218, 220, 383 N.E.2d 1043, 1044
(1979); Dull v. State, 267 Ind. 549, 552, 372 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1978).
44.

See, e.g., Hollonquest v. State,

__

Ind.

,

.

432 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1982);

Adams at __, 430 N.E.2d at 774; Crisp v. State, 271 Ind. 534, 536, 394 N.E.2d 115,
119 (1979); Cottingham, 269 Ind. at 263, 379 N.E.2d at 986.
45.
Ind. at

__,

See, e.g., Hollonquest, __ Ind. at __
430 N.E.2d at 774; Leaver v. State, -

, 432 N.E.2d at 39; Adams, __
414 N.E.2d 959,
Ind.

960 (1981); Duncan, 272 Ind. at 616, 400 N.E.2d at 1114.
Ind. at _ 430 N.E.2d at 775 ("We do not second46. See, e.g., Adams, guess matters of trial strategy and tactics in evaluating an allegation of incompetence
414 N.E.2d at 961 ("[In reviewing a claim of
of counsel."); Leaver __ Ind. at -,
inadequate counsel, we will not second-guess the attorney's decisions as to trial strategy
and tactics."); Duncan, 272 Ind. at 618, 400 N.E.2d at 115 ("[W]e will not pass judgment on the merits or demerits of the strategy employed."). For discussion of tactics
see infra note 148 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Duncan, 272 Ind. at 616, 400 N.E.2d at 1114 ("While these examples
may reflect a lack of experience in trying criminal cases, they do not support appellant's
conclusion that he was therefore inadequately represented.").
48. See, e.g., Hollonquest __ Ind. at -, 432 N.E.2d at 39 ("Isolated poor
strategy, bad tactics, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective
counsel."); Adams

__

Ind. at

-,

430 N.E.2d at 775 ("the decision to move forward

with joint rather than separate trials was a strategic one. We do not second-guess
matters of trial strategy .

.

."); Hollon 272 Ind. at 444, 398 N.E.2d at 1277 ("Isolated

poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel .... ").
The error in judgment is an offshoot of the refusal to second-guess trial strategy.
The court has stated: "Deliberate choices made by counsel for some contemplated tactical or strategic reason which turn out to be detrimental to the client's cause do
not establish ineffective representation." Field v. State,

-

Ind.

426 N.E.2d

671, 673 (1981).
49. Blackburn v. State, 260 Ind. 5, 22, 291 N.E.2d 686, 696 (1973) ("A poor
result alone does not amount to denial of adequate assistance of counsel.").
50.

See, e.g., Quinn v. State,

__

Ind.

__

. 436 N.E.2d 70, 71 (1982)

("[Hie must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of his counsel
reduced the entire criminal proceedings to a mockery of justice."); Hendrix v. State,
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The "mockery of justice" standard of review for ineffective
counsel claims employs a due process analysis instead of a sixth amendment examination. Under due process analysis, the reviewing court
judges the attorney's actions in the context of the trial. The crucial
question is whether the attorney's actions or inactions turn the trial
into a farce or mockery. While that inquiry insures the defendant a
fair trial in accordance with due process requirements,51 it does not
insure the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.2
The sixth amendment is a constitutional guarantee, thus, a claim
of a sixth amendment violation requires a sixth amendment examination. Using a sixth amendment approach, the court will examine the
attorney's representation. While in a due process or "mockery"
approach, the court will examine the trial as a whole. The right to
effective assistance of counsel requires that the court examine the
attorney's representation qua representation, not examine the trial
under a due process test.'
418 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 (1981) ("Absent a glaring and critical comInd. - mission or succession of omissions evidencing in their totality a mockery of justice,
this Court will not attribute a criminal conviction or affirmation to ineffective assistance
, 417 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1981) ("[A]
Ind.
.,
of counsel."); Rahim v. State, defendant must show that his representation was so inadequate as to reduce the trial,
414 N.E.2d at
taken as a whole, to a mockery of justice."); Leaver __ Ind. at __,
960 ("In reviewing an issue of this type, we look to the totality of the facts and circumstances . . ."); Hollon, 272 Ind. at 444, 398 N.E.2d at 1277; ("In applying the mockery
of justice adequacy standard, this Court will look to the totality of the circumstances
at trial.").
51. Due process is derived from the fifth amendment which reads in part:
"No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... U.S.
U
CONST. amend. V (1976).
52. Since a reviewing court determines whether counsel's actions turned the
trial into a "mockery of justice," the court necessarily is reviewing the trial. However,
since Gideon incorporated the sixth amendment via the fourteenth amendment as binding on the states, and the sixth amendment has been interpreted to mean effective
counsel, McMann, 37 U.S. at 771, the court must look at the attorney's actions individually as well as collectively in the context of the trial. "One may receive ineffective assistance of counsel even though the proceedings have not been a farce or
mockery." Adams, __ Ind. at __ , 430 N.E.2d at 776 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (citing
Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974)). For commentary on the variance
in the sixth amendment and due process approaches see Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel, supra note 1.
53. For example, if an attorney failed to call a witness who could establish
an alibi for the defendant, either because the attorney neglected to confer with the
defendant and learn of such an alibi witness or the attorney merely neglected to call
the witness, then the action, or misaction, may go undetected and uncorrected under
a due process type of analysis. A due process examination would focus on the rudiments
of the trial: did the defendant have counsel, was the defendant apprised of his rights,
did the jury selection and makeup conform to constitutional and statutory mandates?
___
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Historical Standard
Prior to the implementation of the "mockery" standard,' the Indiana Supreme Court employed the standard set out in Castro v.
State5:
[M]ere perfunctory action by an attorney assuming to represent one accused of a crime which falls short of presenting
the evidence favorable to him and invoking the rules of law
intended to prevent conviction for an offense of which the
accused is innocent, or the imposition of a penalty more
severe than is deserved, should not be tolerated.'
By using a standard which reviewed the quality of representation by
the attorney, the court employed a test directed at protecting the
sixth amendment guarantee rather than one directed at the fifth
amendment guarantee of due process.5 ' The "perfunctory" standard
of Castro looked to the attorney's representation to see if it adhered
to a constitutional minimum, thus setting a standard which adequately
protected the defendant's right to effective counsel.
The "perfunctory" standard initially employed by Indiana courts
was an effective method of reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel

The list goes on. However, such an analysis would not confront the attorney's representation, rather, it confronts the question of whether the trial met a test of inherent
fairness required under due process. On the other hand, if the attorney's representation were examined under the sixth amendment, representation qua representation,
and in compliance with specific guidelines and normative conduct, then the examination would be directed at the attorney's action. A claim of ineffective counsel requires
an examination of the counsel's representation, not the overall fairness of the trial.
54. Shack v. State, 249 Ind. 67, 231 N.E.2d 36 (1967). The Indiana court apparently thought that the "mockery of justice" standard was merely a restatement
of its "perfunctory" standard. Moreover, the court in Shack combined the language
of the standards in applying the "perfunctory" standard and found the defendant's
counsel inadequate. Id. at 79-80, 231 N.E.2d at 44. However, in subsequent cases, the
court used the language of the "mockery" standard in reviewing ineffective assistance
claims. This change was in line with the growth of the "mockery" standard in other
state and federal jurisdictions. The change, however, imperceptible in the first case,
resulted in a general acceptance of the "mockery test" and a noticeable difference
in the standard of review in ineffective counsel claims.
55. 196 Ind. 385, 147 N.E. 321 (1925).
56. Id. at 388, 147 N.E. at 323.
57. In applying the "perfunctory" standard the court uses due process language.
However, the test is directed at the level of representation rather than the quality
of the trial alone. In Hillman v. State, 234 Ind. 27, 123 N.E.2d 180 (1954), the court
mentions that ineffective representation deprived the defendant of due process of law.
However, the court had initially found that the representation violated the defendant's
sixth amendment rights. Id. at 32-33, 123 N.E.2d at 183.
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claims. In Wilson v. State," the court reversed a conviction based upon
a claim of ineffective counsel. 59 Wilson was convicted of receiving and
concealing stolen goods valued less than $25. The same attorney appointed for trial was appointed for appeal but there was no record
of anything done by him.' In reversing the conviction, the court stated
that "when, as here, there has been a lack of representation as to
be equivalent to or worse than no representation whatsoever.., we
are left with no alternative but to... reverse."'" The court examined
both the attorney's actions and failures to act"2 and found representation substantially lacking, thereby denying the accused his constitutional rights."3
Other earlier Indiana cases exemplify the effectiveness of the
prior "perfunctory" standard. In Hillman v. State," the defendant
alleged that the attorney, among other failures, made no argument,
called no witnesses (including known alibi witnesses), and failed to
move for a court reporter to record the proceedings." The attorney
testified that he could not locate the alibi witnesses. The court,
however, questioned the attorney's failure to pursue the witnesses
more diligently. Such questioning conflicts with the presumption of
58. 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943).
59. Id. at 83, 51 N.E.2d at 856.
60. Id. at 68, 51 N.E.2d at 850.
61. Id. at 83, 51 N.E.2d at 856.
62. The defendant alleged that the trial judge stepped out of his role by
warning defendant, in front of the jury, not to perjure himself thereby casting doubt
upon the credibility of defendant's testimony. The defense counsel failed to object and
therefore, failed to preserve the error. Defense counsel also allegedly failed to adequately object to inadmissible evidence thereby damaging the defendant's case. (The
objection defense counsel raised was, "I object to that stuff, Your Honor, all outside
the issues.") Id. at 75, 51 N.E.2d at 853. Further, the objection was raised after the
testimony had been heard.
63. Id. at 83, 51 N.E.2d at 856. The court ended its opinion with a carefully
worded paragraph thereby narrowing the holding of the case.
We do not hold that a defeated litigant in every or the usual case where
his attorney has ignorantly or carelessly failed to save and present an
error may nevertheless have it reviewed and made the basis of reversal
of the judgment. Ordinarily, procedural rules must be observed by the
litigants and may not be ignored by reviewing courts. To hold otherwise
would invite appeals and violate precedents that have given necessary
order and stability to our appellate practice.
Id. at 83, 51 N.E.2d at 856. The court obviously was concerned then, as it is now,
of opening the floodgates of litigation for convicted defendants on ineffective assistance
grounds.
64. 234 Ind. 27, 123 N.E.2d 180 (1954).
65. Id. at 29, 123 N.E.2d at 180.
66. Id. at 31, 123 N.E.2d at 182.
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competence employed by the Indiana courts under the present
"mockery" standard.' The court in HiUman refuted that presumption
when it said:
Under our laws the court must perform its duties with
reference to such defense in the utmost good faith, by the
appointment of a competent attorney. It is not sufficient
just to appoint one who has been admitted to the bar, but
it must be an attorney who not only has the ability to defend but who has a determined will to defend. . .."
The attorney's actions must be more than perfunctory 9 and must
reveal a certain amount of ability before a presumption of competence
may arise. The earlier "perfunctory" standard required a higher level
of attorney competence and a more searching critique by courts than
does the present day "mockery" test and thereby assured the accused
that his right to effective counsel would be adequately protected by
the courts.
Present Standard
The present standard of review for a claim based upon ineffective counsel in Indiana is the "mockery of justice" standard"0 which
employs a due process analysis. The court modified the "mockery"
test by adding the requirement of "adequate legal representation at
each stage of the proceedings."'" However, the modification has had
little, if any, real effect on the "mockery" standard.' Following the
modification to the "mockery" standard," the court has failed to employ

67. Id. at 30, 123 N.E.2d at 181. It appears that the court began its examination of the attorney's actions by questioning the rationale. Such action by the court
does little to reinforce a presumption of competence. The court's examination begins
by questioning the attorney's adequacy rather than accepting the presumption of
competence.
68. Id. at 34, 123 N.E.2d at 183.
69. Id. at 33, 123 N.E.2d at 182 (citing Castro, 196 Ind. at 391, 147 N.E.2d
at 323); Wilson, 222 Ind. at 81, 51 N.E2d at 855.
70. See, e.g., Adams, __ Ind. at __, 430 N.E.2d at 773 ("the proper test
• . . is the mockery of justice standard .. ").
71. Thomas v. State, 251 Ind. 546, 242 N.E.2d 919 (1969).
72. See, e.g., Darnell v. State, __ Ind. __, 435 N.E.2d 250 (1982) (applying
the modified "mockery" test but not questioning the adequacy of representation; the
court used the presumption of competence principle to pass over the ineffectiveness
issue); Adams, __ Ind. at _
430 N.E.2d at 773 (applying the Thomas modification
but not examining the adequacy of the representation of the attorney); Miller v. State,
__
Ind. 405 N.E.2d 909, 913 (1980) (applying the "mockery of justice adequacy" standard but merely listing defense counsel's actions as proof of adequacy and
proof that the trial was not a "mockery"); Duncan, 272 Ind. at 618, 400 N.E.2d at
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a test which adequately resolves the question of ineffective counsel
or impels the use of the "adequate legal representation" modification.
Indiana courts have not changed the rationale utilized in analyzing
ineffective counsel allegations and the issue has not been reviewed
74
any more stringently since the modification.
Indiana courts continue to presumptively affirm criminal convictions brought before them requesting relief based upon a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The courts do so because the attorney's actions do not reduce the trial into a "mockery of justice."
Thus, the "adequate legal representation" modification has had no real
5
effect. For example, in Crisp v. State"
the Indiana Supreme Court
heard and rejected the defendant's claim for relief based on ineffective counsel grounds." The defendant alleged that counsel failed to
make an opening statement, failed to record opening statements and
1115 (applying the modified standard as adequate but holding that none of the strategies
by defense counsel turned the proceedings into a "mockery"); Holton, 272 Ind. at 444-46,
398 N.E.2d at 1278-79 (applying the Thomas modification but merely going through
a list of actions by defense counsel during trial and not examining them for adequacy);
Crisp, 271 Ind. at 537, 394 N.E.2d at 119-22 (citing Thomas as modifying the "mockery"
test into a worthy standard but not examining the actions of the attorneys apart from
the trial or as being adequate, the court recognized the representation as less than
"optimal" and not in line with standard practice of defense attorneys, but held the
representation did not make a "mockery" of the proceedings); Jones v. State, 270 Ind.
141, 143-44, 387 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1978) (claiming adequate legal representation modification insures competence, but did not delve into the adequacy of representation, instead, the court merely stated that what the attorney did was adequate); Cottingham,
269 Ind. at 264, 379 N.E.2d at 986 (claiming "mockery" as modified by "adequate legal
representation" will insure competence, but finding that defense counsel did not turn
the proceedings into a "mockery").
73. Thomas, 251 Ind. at 557, 242 N.E.2d at 925 ("It is reversible error not
to provide a defendant in a criminal prosecution with adequate legal representation
at each stage of the proceedings ..
.
74. It is an ironic note that Thomas is the case which the court cites as providing the modification "adequate legal representation." In Thomas, the court found
that the public defender presented inadequate representation, id. at 555, 242 N.E.2d
at 924, and granted a new trial. Id. at 557, 242 N.E.2d at 925. In the new trial Thomas
was again convicted. He then appealed and the conviction was affirmed. Thomas v.
State, 262 Ind. 590, 321 N.E.2d 194 (1975). He then sought post-conviction relief which
was denied, whereupon he appealed the denial of post-conviction relief. Thomas v. State,
SInd. ,417 N.E.2d 1124 (1981). In this appeal Thomas again alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel. In deciding the ineffective assistance issue the court applied
the "mockery of justice" test. Id. at
- 417 N.E.2d at 1127. Ironically, the court
does not mention the "adequate legal modification" which stemmed from the initial
reversal. The very case which the court cites as modifying the "mockery" standard
does not employ the modification.
75. 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d 115 (1979).
76. Id. at 542, 394 N.E.2d at 122.
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voir dire, and failed to interview the prosecution's witnesses." The
court recognized that "interviewing all witnesses is standard practice
among defense attorneys"7 but stated that the decision of this attorney reflects: "A distinction between an exceptionally careful defense
lawyer and a defense lawyer who may, in part, conform to trial court
practice in carrying out the administration of a busy trial court."79
The court' concluded that, although the representation was not
"optimal," it did not amount to a mockery of justice, based on the
attorney's other actions during trial.' The court thus refused to look
at counsel's representation qua representation, but rather looked to
the entire trial and thereby effectively circumvented the essential examination under the constitutional guarantee to effective counsel.
Defense counsel's apparent lack of expertise in evidentiary matters was the basis of the defendant's appeal in Duncan v. State.2 The
court held that, even if the allegations were true and evidenced
defense counsel's inexperience, the allegations did not prove that
counsel was ineffective. The court based its decision upon the defendant's failure to show a connection between the alleged errors and
the conviction. ' As a result, a defendant claiming ineffective counsel
must prove that prejudice to his case resulted from the alleged errors
of trial counsel.8 ' In essence, the defendant must show that the conviction was a direct result of counsel's errors. 5
77. Id. at 537-38, 394 N.E.2d at 119.
78. Id. at 539, 394 N.E.2d at 121.
79. Id. at 537, 394 N.E.2d at 119.
80. Id. at 541, 394 N.E.2d at 122.
81. Id.
82. 272 Ind. 614, 400 N.E.2d 1112 (1980).
83. Id. at 617, 400 N.E.2d at 1114 ("Even if we were to conclude that these
incidents reflect mistakes or counsel's lack of expertise on certain questions of evidence,
appellant can show no real prejudice.").
84. Id. at 617, 400 N.E.2d at 1115 (appellant failed to show how the alleged
errors harmed his case). See also Crisp, 271 Ind. at 537-38, 394 N.E.2d at 120 (defendant failed to show how his case was prejudiced by the alleged errors of the trial
attorney).
85. The requirement of proving prejudice implies the "harmless error" rule
as set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The court in Chapman held
that not all trial errors concerning constitutional rights required reversal. Id. at 22.
However, the court required that once constitutional error was shown it must be proved
that the error was indeed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24. Moreover,
the burden of proof rests on the prosecution; the beneficiary of the error. Id. This
"harmless error" approach is used in jurisdictions which employ an objective sixth
amendment analysis of ineffective assistance claims. See, e.g. McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1974); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). However, the specific time at which the burden rests with
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The requirement of proving prejudice conflicts with the court's
holding that a conviction is not evidence of ineffectiveness.' The merits
of the trial are not at issue in deciding an ineffective counsel allegation, rather, it is the quality of the representation which is at issue.
The Indiana Supreme Court under the "mockery" standard requires
that the defendant prove that trial counsel's errors resulted in a conviction before relief is granted. 7 However, in a recent case there appears the first hint that the Indiana Supreme Court is aware of the
need for reform of the "mockery" standard. In Adams v. State," the
Indiana Supreme Court held that counsel who failed to call an alibi
witness who was present at trial, failed to move for separate trials
of co-defendants, and failed to allow the defendant to testify, provided
constitutionally adequate counsel.89
In a strongly argued dissent, one justice called for a reanalyzation of the present "mockery" standard.' The dissent emphasized that
the modification requiring "adequate legal representation" must be
given substantive weight. "One may receive ineffective assistance of
counsel even though the proceedings have not been a farce or
mockery."' In addition, the dissent argued that true application of
this "mockery" standard, as modified by "adequate legal representation," demands a constitutional scrutiny of the quality of representation by counsel as well as of the rudiments of trial." The dissent then
proceeded to examine the quality of the attorney's actions and found
the prosecution varies. Most jurisdictions require the defendant to couple allegations
of ineffective assistance with colorable claims of evidence. Once accomplished, the burden
rests on the prosecution to show the errors harmless.
The "mockery of justice" standard, on the other hand, requires the defendant
to prove that the alleged instances of ineffectiveness prejudiced his case. The entire
burden rests on the defendant. Prejudice may be difficult to prove, especially in a
direct appeal when the reviewing court is limited to the record of the case. McQueen,
498 F.2d at 221 (applying United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
1973)). See infra note 115. Moreover, placing the burden of proof upon the defendant
in essence requires him to prove his innocence, id. at 1204, which is contrary to the
prevailing standard that a defendant is presumed innocent until guilt is proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.
86. Blackburn, 260 Ind. at 22, 291 N.E.2d at 696 ("A poor result alone does
not amount to denial of adequate assistance of counsel.").
87. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 1, at 538-40.
88. Ind. -,
430 N.E.2d 771 (1982).
89. Id. at __, 430 N.E.2d at 775.
90. Id. at -,
430 N.E.2d at 776 (Hunter, J., dissenting) ("I feel that the
circumstances as shown by the record in this case demand a more thorough analysis
of our standard.").
91. Id. (citing Herring, 491 F.2d at 128).
92. Adams, Ind. at , 430 N.E.2d at 777.
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them substantially deficient. The dissent recommended a reversal and
new trial on the basis that "the quality of representation by defendant's trial attorney fell far short of the adequate legal representa93
tion standard we require.
In summary, the Indiana Supreme Court currently employs a
standard of review for ineffective counsel claims which does not adequately protect the constitutional guarantee of effective counsel. The
court has digressed from its previous "perfunctory" standard which
provided adequate protection of the defendant's right to effective
counsel to the present "mockery" standard, which emphasizes the
defendant's due process rights rather than the right to effective
counsel. Though the court has modified the "mockery" standard with
language that is directed at the right to effective counsel, it has failed
to give effect to that language. The Indiana Supreme Court must
either give full effect to the modification or adopt a new standard
which adequately protects a defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel.
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

ProceduralAspects
The issue of ineffective counsel can be raised at different times
in the criminal process. 4 Ineffectiveness of counsel may be raised on
direct appeal 5 or in post-conviction proceedings." If not raised on
appeal, the issue may be deemed waived, 97 although waiver is a mat-

93. Id. at __, 430 N.E.2d at 781. It can be argued that the legal system
itself requires effective assistance of counsel for its own integrity. If we are to believe
in the integrity of the system-that the system works-then there must be effective
counsel. This systematic need for effective counsel and adequate representation requires that counsel's representation, not only the overall trial, be examined for constitutional and normative deficiencies or there can be no faith or justice in the judicial
system.
94. Ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised in a direct appeal or through
collateral attack by mean of post-conviction proceedings. See Note, Developments in
the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970). See also, Peller, In Defense
of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 581 (1982).
95. See, e.g., Duncan, 272 Ind. 614, 400 N.E2d 1112.
96. See, e.g., Adams, __
Ind. _.,
430 N.E.2d 771.
97. Hollonquest, __
Ind. at - 432 N.E.2d at 39 (Saying a post-conviction
remedy is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Also, "[Tihe failure to raise the issue
of inadequacy of his trial counsel is petitioner's direct appeal ordinarily constitutes
a waiver of this issue."). See also Dull, 267 Ind. at 551, 372 N.E.2d at 174 (defendant
waived the ineffectiveness issue by not raising it on his direct appeal).
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ter of judicial discretion." The ineffectiveness issue if raised and
reviewed on direct appeal may not be raised in post-conviction proceedings although that is similarly a matter of judicial discretion."
Raising the issue at either time creates several problems.
Raising a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal creates
practical problems. If the court-appointed attorney on appeal is the
same attorney appointed for the trial, he may be less than eager to
raise his own incompetence as a basis for relief. 00 The court, if it does
not appoint new counsel for appeal, is forcing the appointed attorney
either to waive the ineffective assistance issue and thereby possibly
deny the defendant that constitutional right, or to raise the ineffective assistance issue and thereby damage his own reputation and
possibly ruin his career. This dilemma should never arise. The court,
by simply appointing new counsel for the appeal would resolve the
problem and guarantee that the defendant's constitutional rights will
be protected with the requisite zeal."0 ' Nevertheless, the dilemma continues to exist.
The result of the dilemma is that many ineffective assistance
claims are not heard until raised in post-conviction proceedings. Postconviction claims are usually heard long after the trial is over, at a
time when memories have faded, evidence has disappeared, witnesses
have relocated, and courts have tired of rehashing the same issues."°2

436 N.E.2d 79, 81 (1982)
98. See, e.g., Henson v. State, __ Ind.
(the court acknowledged the possibility of waiver, but proceeded to address the issue).
430 N.E.2d at 773 ("Issues raised and deter99. Adams, __ Ind. at __,
mined on direct appeal are not reviewable in a post-conviction proceeding."). However,
this is easily sidestepped by alleging ineffective assistance of the appellate counsel.
Hollonquest, - Ind. at __, 432 N.E.2d at 39 (court heard post-conviction petition
on ineffectiveness issue because defendant also alleged incompetence of appellate
attorney).
100. See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 24-26.
101. An attorney will obviously pursue a claim of ineffective assistance more
zealously if the claim is directed at another attorney's inadequacies. The court's appointment of new counsel for appeal will relieve the trial attorney of the decision
whether to pursue a challenge to his own competence as a grounds for overturning
his client's conviction.
There are other issues raised by the distinction between retained counsel and
counsel assigned by the judiciary. The issues raised by ineffective assistance of counsel
claims against retained counsel are beyond the scope of this note.
Ind. at __,
432 N.E.2d at 39 (post-conviction
102. See, e.g., Hollonquest, __
remedy not a substitute for a direct appeal; failure to raise the issue of the inadequacy of his trial counsel in petitioner's direct appeal ordinarily constitutes a waiver
of the issue). Post-conviction necessarily happens after trial and appeal. Because of
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For these reasons courts tend to deny post-conviction relief in the
form of a new trial. However, these reasons are not based on constitutional grounds.' Unlike the guarantee of effective counsel, which
has several constitutional bases,0 4 denial of post-conviction relief is
5
often based purely on practical grounds."0
However, practical matters, such as judicial economy, must not be allowed to supersede constitutional rights, especially at the cost of an individual's liberty.
The Indiana Supreme Court uses such pragmatic reasons as a
means of evading a direct confrontation of the effectiveness of counsel
issue. The court makes its decision on practical grounds and then uses
the facts of the specific case to bolster its decision. This method of
skirting the issue is prevalent in post-conviction proceedings. In postconviction proceedings the reviewing judge is given nearly unbridled
discretion.' 6 The Indiana courts have uniformly held that, in postconviction proceedings, the judge is the sole arbiter of the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. His decision is
to be reviewed only where the evidence is without conflict and leads
unerringly to a result not reached by the trial court.' 7 As a result,
the defendant labors under a heavy burden in post-conviction proceedings. The defendant can only overcome the strong presumption
of competence of the attorney"' by clear and convincing evidence."'
Presumption of Competence
There is sound rationale underlying the presumption of competence which the courts employ."' Defense counsel has graduated
the heavy court dockets and built-in delays of the system, appeals from denial of postconviction claims are late in developing.
103. One practical reason for refusing relief on ineffective counsel claims is
the belief held by the court that the defendants are "guilty anyway." See Bazelon,
supra note 1, at 26-29. ("It is the belief-rarely articulated, but I am afraid, widely
held-that most criminal defendants are guilty anyway."). This belief undergrids the
efficiency arguments. Why allow defendants who are "guilty anyway" to clutter up
the courts. Id. at 26.
104. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
105. Judicial economy is one practical reason which the courts use to bypass
the ineffectiveness issue. See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 26.
106. See, e.g., Adams, __
Ind. at __,
430 N.E.2d at 774 ("In post-conviction
proceedings, the judge is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses . . . It is apparent the post-conviction judge chose to believe one
set of witnesses and not the other. It is within his discretion to do so.").
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Leaver, - Ind. at _,
414 N.E.2d at 960 ("There is a strong
presumption that an attorney has properly discharged his duties to his client.").
109. See, e.g., Hollonquest, Ind. at ,_
432 N.E.2d at 39 ("strong
and convincing evidence is required to rebut the presumption").
110. See, e.g., Field, Ind. at ,426 N.E.2d at 673 ("This presumption
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from law school where the basics required to practice law presumably
were taught. Additionally, having passed the state's bar examination,
counsel has demonstrated that he possesses the requisite skills to competently practice law in that state. These requirements are evidence
that an attorney has achieved a certain modicum of competence, but
they do not prove that the attorney provided effective assistance during a specific trial."' A presumption of competence is well placed in
dealing with claims which are patently frivolous. However, the
presumption of competence should not be given overriding priority
merely because counsel has exhibited competence in the past. The
presumption of competence has been abused by the Indiana courts.
The abuse is evident in two aspects of the "mockery" standard and
the pragmatic concerns of the court. The court makes the presumption of competence nearly irrebuttable by placing an almost unattainable burden of proof on the defendant. Also, the court defers to
counsel's strategy in an effort to bring about its pragmatic concerns
of judicial integrity and economy.112
Rebutting the Presumption
At the appellate level, evidence of alleged incompetence can
usually be shown only through the trial record.1 The record will show
only what the attorney did during the trial and, unless totally incongruous with normal court procedure, bolster an already
overweighted presumption of competence. The record consists of the
attorney's actions during the trial; calling witnesses, conducting direct
and cross-examination, and making objections. Thus, the record
necessarily demonstrates that the attorney was active at trial."'
However, the record does not show what an attorney may have failed
is rationally grounded in the educational and other requirements for admission to the
practice of law.").
111. As the court noted in Hillman v. State, 234 Ind. 27, 34, 123 N.E.2d 180,
183 (1954) "It is not sufficient just to appoint [an attorney] who has been admitted
to the bar."
112. See infra note 147.
113. See, e.g., Duncan, 272 Ind. at 617, 400 N.E.2d at 1114 ("Because appellant
has chosen to raise the issue on direct appeal, we must decide this question solely
on the record of this trial."). The record, however, will not evidence the errors or omissions which occurred during the trial. In other words, the record will rarely show
that an attorney was ineffective.
114. Id. at 618, 400 N.E.2d at 1114. See also Miller, __ Ind. at __, 405 N.E.2d
at 913 (finding that the record showed that defense counsel filed motions and notices
but the court did not examine the adequacy of these actions); Merida, 270 Ind. at 220,
383 N.E.2d at 1045 (finding that the record only showed what attorney did); Kerns
v. State, 265 Ind. 39, 42-43, 349 N.E.2d 701, 703 (1976) (finding that the record showed
that attorney did not make a thorough investigation but finding the representation
adequate).
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to do or even if the actions recorded during the trial were effective." 5
In Crisp v. State,"' the court held that counsel's failure to demand
that opening statements and voir dire be recorded did not evidence
incompetence because the defendant failed to prove that any prejudice
resulted from such a failure." 7 Furthermore, the court observed that
if anything prejudicial had occurred during opening statements or voir
dire, defense counsel could have objected and demanded a court
reporter."' However, the unrecorded events are lost for appeal. If
defense counsel is incompetent, as the defendant alleges, then counsel's
failure to record part of the trial is certainly evidence of that incompetence. The defendant will not be able to identify prejudice on
every occasion. Even an attorney appointed for appeal will not be
able to discern prejudice if there is no record to examine.'
In direct appeals, allegations of incompetence also may be based
on evidence outside of the trial record." ° The Indiana courts have
heard these allegations and consistently rejected them for lack of
115. The record merely shows what the attorney did. Combining this evidence
of action with the strong presumption of competence makes an almost insurmountable
obstacle for a defendant alleging ineffective assistance under the "mockery" test. Judge
Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that such a problem exists:
"[Piroof of prejudice may well be absent from the record precisely because counsel
has been ineffective." DeCoster, 487 F.2d, at 1204. DeCoster was convicted of aiding
and abetting an armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon and he appealed.
Id. [hereinafter referred to as DeCoster I]. The court raised sua sponte the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1205. The district
court held a hearing on the competency of counsel issue and denied the motion for
a new trial. The Circuit court in a panel decision reversed the conviction but granted
the government's motion for a rehearing en banc. United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283
(D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as DeCoster II].
At the rehearing, the circuit vacated the decision of DeCoster II. DeCoster v.
United States, 624 F.2d 196, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (hereinafter referred to as DeCoster
III]. In a plurality opinion, the circuit court upheld DeCoster's conviction on the grounds
that he was provided with adequate counsel. Furthermore, the opinion rejected the
strict "guidelines" principle of DeCoster I and set abstract guidelines. Judge Bazelon
and Chief Judge Wright authored a strong dissent, underscoring the lack of a majority, which reiterated the guidelines of DeCoster I and emphasizing that the burden
of proof of prejudice must lie with the prosecution. DeCoster, 624 F.2d at 275 (Bazelon,
J., Wright, C.J. dissenting).
116. 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d 115.
117. Id. at 537-38, 394 N.E.2d at 119.
118. Id.
119. An appeal is usually based on the transcript of the trial. See supra note
111. If there is no court reporter there is no trial transcript, and an attorney on appeal has no way of adducing alleged errors during trial.
120. See supra note 113. However, the evidence typically consists of attorney's
inactions which the defendant must show prejudiced the case. These inactions are not
reflected in the trial record. See supra note 113.
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specificity,'21 or because the claims fail to show how the alleged inadequacies harm the defendant. 2 The Indiana Supreme Court has
stated that "allegations of incompetence, even if unrefuted, are not
alone sufficient to rebut the presumption of competence." = Allegations
that defense counsel failed to call or interview witnesses are not
enough. 2' The defendant must show what an uncalled witness would
have said." This requirement demands that the defendant know what
the witness will testify to before they actually testify. Moreover, the
court has held that allegations as to the testimony of a prospective
witness are insufficient without supporting evidence.' The presumption of competence in a direct appeal is difficult to meet and the
presumption in a post-conviction hearing is likewise difficult to rebut.
In a post-conviction hearing, the defendant is allowed to testify
as to what counsel did or did not do and to any alleged inadequacies."
However, as in the direct appeal, the testimony is given little, if any,
121. See, e.g., Crisp, 271 Ind. at 538, 394 N.E.2d at 120 ("Defendant does not
state specifically what could have been brought out in favor of defendant had Father
Weber been called as a defense witness.").
122. See, e.g., Rapier v. State, __ Ind.
435 N.E.2d 31, 36 (1982)
(requiring defendant to show how an objection would have prevented damaging
evidence); Cowell, Ind. at
-. , 416 N.E.2d at 842 ("This Court has consistently
sought to determine if and how a defense attorney's alleged inadequacies have harmed
defendant at trial.").
123. Kerns, 265 Ind. at 42, 349 N.E.2d at 703.
124. See, e.g., Adams, - Ind. at - 430 N.E.2d at 775 ("appellant's counsel
did not demonstrate incompetence by failing to call Vails as a witness."); Beard v.
State, __
Ind. 428 N.E.2d 772, 774 (1981) (alleged failure to examine tests
was insufficient because defendant failed to show how an inquiry would reveal exculpatory evidence); Duncan, 272 Ind. at 617, 400 N.E.2d at 1115 ("Appellant has not
shown how any of trial counsel's alleged mistakes harmed his cause."); Crisp, 271 Ind.
at 538, 394 N.E.2d at 120 (the defendant did not show how failure to interview defense
witnesses prejudiced the case).
125. See, e.g., Quinn, __ Ind. at __,
436 N.E.2d at 72 (requiring that the
defendant show what witnesses would have testified to had they been called); Hollon,
272 Ind. at 445, 398 N.E.2d at 1278 ("To prevail on this issue, defendant must show
what these witnesses would have said."); Crisp, 271 Ind. at 538, 394 N.E.2d at 120
(not finding inadequate counsel because the defendant failed to show what the witness
would have said).
126. See, e.g., Quinn, - Ind. at , 436 N.E.2d at 72. In Quinn the court
found counsel adequate. The defendant appellant testified that uncalled witnesses would
have offered evidence tending to exonerate him. However, as the record below contained "no other testimony concerning those witnesses" the Quinn court refused to
find counsel inadequate. Id.
127. Baker v. State, __ Ind.
435 N.E2d 990, 992 (1982). Also the
courts look to the record which again will only show what the attorney did, not if
he was effective or if he failed to do something which may have prejudiced the defendant. Davis v. State, __ Ind. -,
446 N.E.2d 1317 (1983) (the record does not show
that the attorney presented ineffective assistance of counsel).
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weight. " It is only if the attorney whose own incompetence is being
raised admits to the incompetence that the allegations are sufficient
for relief." If the testimony of the defendant is uncorroborated" or
in direct conflict with that of the attorney, then the presumption of
competence favors the attorney."' Testimony by a second attorney
appointed to pursue the post-conviction relief will not overcome the
presumption. 32 Only if the attorney who represented the defendant
at trial admits to his ineffectiveness or if the record shows that the
representation turned the trial into a mockery will the defendant
achieve a favorable result in post-conviction proceedings."
The reviewing judge in post-conviction proceedings requires that
the defendant seeking relief based on ineffective counsel provide
specific evidence of the attorney's inadequacies. Often the evidence
produced by the defendant seeking relief is rejected as too speculative
or unspecific.'- In Adams v. State,1" the defendant alleged that counsel
128. Davis, __ Ind. at -,
446 N.E.2d at 1321-22.
129. Quinn, __ Ind. at -,
436 N.E.2d at 72 (testimony of defendant is uncorroborated and the trial lawyer was not a witness and therefore the presumption
of competence prevails). See also DeVillez v. State, Ind. -,
.
416 N.E.2d
846, 850 (1981) (competing evidence between defendant and defense attorney and
presumption of competence prevails). But see Hendrix, __ Ind. at __,
418 N.E.2d
at 1162 (hearing trial counsel's testimony as to admitted errors in judgment but finding
the representation adequate anyway).
130. Quinn, __ Ind. at , 436 N.E.2d at 72.
131. Cochran v. State, __ Ind. , 445 N.E.2d 974 (1983) (holding that if
there is uncorroborated allegations of error by the trial counsel, then the inference
is that counsel was effective); DeVillez, __ Ind. at 416 N.E.2d at 850 (competing
evidence between defendant and defense counsel and the court held that defense counsel
provided competent counsel).
132. Leaver, __ Ind. at
-, 414 N.E.2d at 961 (saying the post-conviction
appellate attorney's criticism of the trial attorney's representation was based merely
on the benefit of hindsight).
133. A favorable result does not necessarily mean an acquittal. A reversal of
the trial court's conviction results in a new trial. However, since much time has lapsed
due to the time requirements of the court, a reversal in post-conviction proceedings
may be tantamount to an acquittal.
134. See, e.g., Quinn, __ Ind. at , 436 N.E.2d at 72 (requiring that defendant show what witnesses would have testified to if they had been called); Rapier,
__
Ind. at -,
435 N.E.2d at 36 (requiring defendant to show how an objection
would have prevented damaging evidence); Darnell, Ind. at __,
428 N.E.2d at
774 (alleged failure to examine tests was not specific because defendant failed to show
how an inquiry would reveal exculpatory evidence); Leaver, __ Ind. at __, 414 N.E.2d
at 960 (claiming defendant's allegations of incompetence were no more than bald, bare
assertions); Hollon, 272 Ind. at 445, 398 N.E.2d at 1278 (requiring defendant to show
what witnesses would have said); Crisp, 271 Ind. at 538, 394 N.E.2d at 120 (defendant
failed to state specifically any evidence an uncalled witness would have testified to
in favor of defendant); Grimes, 126 Ind. at 687, 366 N.E.2d at 641 (defendant failed
to disclose how the lack of consultation resulted in ineffectiveness).
135. Ind. , 430 N.E.2d 771 (1982).
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was ineffective based on his failure to call witnesses, interview certain witnesses, and disclose the mental state of a specific witness. 36
The court noted that the defendant did not disclose what the uncalled
witnesses would have testified to or what purpose an interview would
have served. Similarly, the defendant gave no evidence of the alleged
mental state of the specific witness.' 7 As a result, the court concluded that the defendant failed to meet the burden of proof and thus
failed to overcome the presumption of competence." 8 It appears that
the court used the presumption of competence to avoid confronting
the ineffectiveness of counsel issue.
Similarly, in Leaver v. State,131 the court refused to grant postconviction relief because the defendant's allegations of incompetence
were boldfaced and bare, backed by no evidence."" The defendant contended that trial counsel failed to raise and preserve issues regarding evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure."" The court
held that the defendant failed to show that the evidence was "in fact"
improperly obtained. 4' Furthermore, the court found that the defendant's allegations that his counsel failed to object to certain testimony
and evidence were merely bald assertions without sufficient proof and
therefore were insufficient to overcome the presumption of
competence." ' The court in Leaver did not address the issue, presented
in the briefs, that defense counsel was ignorant of Indiana law and
had signed a sworn affidavit to that effect.' The court refused to
allow that fact to overcome the presumption of competence. In the
face of counsel's admitted ignorance, the great weight given the
presumption of competence by the Indiana court is misplaced.' 5 A
cursory glance shows the Indiana court's intention to give accord to
136.

Id. at

137.
138.

Id. at
Id.

139.

-

430 N.E.2d at 774.

-,

Ind.

430 N.E.2d at 775.
-

, 414 N.E.2d 959 (1981).

140. Id. at 414 N.E.2d at 960.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143.
144.

Id. at , 414 N.E.2d at 961.
Brief of defendant-appellant at 45-56, Leaver, -

Ind.

-

414 N.E.2d

959. Furthermore, the defendant's attorney had been "in the clothing business," for
thirty (30) years until resuming his law practice three years ago. The attorney was
licensed in Kentucky but "ignorant of the laws of the state of Indiana." Id. He attempted to procure an attorney familiar with Indiana law, offering his entire fee, but
was unable to solicit one. Therefore, he signed the affidavit "to protect my client's
civil rights . . . and to [insure his client's] day in court [to] receive a fair and impartial
trial." Id.
145.

But cf. Smith v. State,

-

Ind.

396 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1979)

("[Clounsel was ineffective in that, because of his ignorance of the law as set down
by the nation's highest court, he could not bring about his intentions.").
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the finality of judgments by presumptively affirming convictions. Only
when the representation is so inadequate as to be shocking to a sense
of justice1" do the Indiana courts seriously delve into the ineffective
assistance issue.
Deferral to Strategy
Another method courts have used to circumvent the substantive
incompetency issue is to rely on the multitude of holdings which state
that courts will not second-guess trial strategy or tactical decisions. " 7
This rationale is based on the theory that anyone, given the benefit
of leisurely retrospection and knowledge of the outcome, will choose
the most beneficial avenue. However, the attorney does not have the
benefit of such hindsight. Counsel must make tactical decisions and
strategy choices at the time they arise and the courts will not view
an honest, but erroneous, tactical judgment as evidence of incompetence. However, problems arise in determining what constitutes
a strategic or tactical decision. "8 It can be argued that everything
146. Leaver, __ Ind. at
_,
_
, 414 N.E.2d at 961. However, ineffective
counsel may not shock the court. "One may receive ineffective assistance of counsel
even though the proceedings have not been a farce or mockery." Adams, __ Ind.
at -.
430 N.E.2d at 776 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (citing Herring, 491 F.2d at 128).
147. See, e.g., Adams, Ind. at _ 430 N.E.2d at 775. ("We do not secondguess matters of trial strategy and tactics in evaluating an allegation of incompetence
of counsel."); Duncan, 272 Ind. at 618, 400 N.E.2d at 1115 ("We will not pass judgment
on the merits or demerits of the strategy employed.").
148. For the purpose of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Indiana
courts seemingly define tactics and strategy as anything which the attorney does. The
courts assume that everything the attorney does is based on a tactical or strategic
choice. However, this cannot be true. In order to defer to counsel's strategy choices
and yet preserve the integrity of the judicial system, the courts should defer to tactical choices which were indeed based on strategy.
Webster's defines tactic as "a device or expedient for accomplishing an end."
It defines strategy as "the art of devising or employing plans or stratagems toward

a goal."

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

2327, 2256 (1961). An attorney

certainly is basing in court decisions towards a specific end or goal-the client's best
interest. However, all actions by an attorney are not necessarily based on a set strategy
or tactic. Some are based on ignorance and total oblivion to the existence of choice.
If the court's are to defer to counsel's strategy, then that strategy must be an informed
choice. Failing to interview witnesses cannot be viewed as strategy when the attorney
does not know what the witness will say. It can be nothing less than negligence and
lead only to ineffective assistance of counsel.
One way to rectify such a problem is to set guidelines for the attorney. If
guidelines are specific, then the attorney will be careful to meet those requirements
and create a record of performance in doing so. Furthermore, the choices the attorney
makes will be informed choices, thereby validating a deferral to an attorney's strategy.
If a definition of tactic or strategy is promulgated by the courts, then a deferral to
such strategy and tactics will not prejudice the integrity of the judicial system.
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done during trial is based on strategy or tactics. Every action
necessarily involves a decision; moreover, a decision to act or not to
act can easily be claimed to be based on strategy. Even erroneous,
ignorant, or incompetent decisions can be labeled as strategic
maneuvers. The Indiana courts, by summarily deferring to trial
counsel's strategy, are evading the substantive ineffectiveness issue.
The Indiana Supreme Court. defers to counsel's strategy as a
means of reinforcing the presumption of competence regardless of the
inadequacy of the strategy. In Crisp v. State,'49 the court recognized
that it is standard practice for a defense attorney to interview all
witnesses," but concluded that it was not evidence of incompetence
for an attorney not to interview witnesses. The court stated that the
defendant failed to show any prejudice by counsel's failure to interview such witnesses and, furthermore, failed to show what the
witnesses would have said. 5' The court also concluded that the decision not to interview witnesses may have been a strategy decision'52
even though the attorney may not have been aware of the potential
help of the witnesses because of his failure to interview." Since the
court noted that the attorney may have been unaware of the potential help of the witnesses and that interviewing such witnesses was
standard practice among defense attorneys, the court should have
examined the decision. Certainly, if the decision was strategy rather
than inadequacy, the decision was questionable and deserving of examination. Yet the court affirmed the conviction deferring to counsel's
strategy decisions." It appears that Indiana courts deem most actions
by attorneys tactical decisions in order to buttress the overweighted
presumption of competence.
Likewise, in Thomas v. State"' the court deferred to counsel's
strategy to avoid confronting the ineffectiveness of counsel issue. The
defendant alleged that counsel's failure to raise certain issues as error
at trial evidenced incompetency and therefore counsel was

149. 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d 115 (1979).
150. Id. at 539, 394 N.E.2d at 121.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 538, 394 N.E.2d at 120 ("Counsel may not have been aware of the
potential contribution these witnesses could have made to defendant's case.").
154. Id. at 541-42, 394 N.E.2d at 121.
155. Ind. -,
417 N.E.2d 1124 (1981). See also McQueen, 498 F.2d at 216
("[tihe attorney's] assertion that he never interviews prosecution witnesses is an absurd
and dangerous policy which can only be viewed as an abdication - not an exercise - of
his professional judgment.").
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ineffective."' The court acknowledged counsel's errors as ineffective
but refused to grant relief because the errors constituted trial
strategy."7 Since the court deferred to counsel's trial strategy, it found
that petitioner's counsel was not ineffective."' However, if the decisions are "instances of ineffectiveness," then the court should grant
relief rather than defer to trial counsel's strategy or at least examine
the effectiveness of the attorney's representation.
It appears that the Indiana courts are more than willing to reinforce their usual affirmation of criminal convictions by rhetoric which
does not adequately delve into the quality of representation. Strategy
and tactics are essential elements of a trial, however, improper decisions must be reviewed in order to determine if the representation
was constitutionally adequate. Obviously, poor strategy or lack of any
strategy can and will produce ineffective assistance of counsel. The
courts should not refuse to examine representation merely to uphold
the integrity of tactical choices. If the representation is adequate then
it will withstand careful scrutiny. The implementation of a new standard which would allow the court discretion to review tactical choices
would insure the protection of a defendant's right to effective
counsel. 59
156. The defendant alleged that the failure of his trial and appellate counsels
to raise the issues of improper venue and the failure to object to additional charges
is evidence of ineffectiveness. Id. at

__,

417 N.E.2d at 1127.

157. Id.
158. Id. ("The instances of ineffectiveness cited by the defendant here, constitute trial strategy, and ... we will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel.").
159. In implementing the power to use their discretion, the judge would
necessarily be reviewing the quality of the choices made by the attorney and thereby
reviewing the adequacy of the representation. The right to effective counsel requires
no more, but it does require the representation be effective as a mandated minimum.
Another issue raised by the deferral to counsel's strategy decisions is the systemic
gap created by the disparity between the standard an attorney is held to in ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the standard required of attorneys to preserve
an error for appeal. In ineffective assistance claims anything an attorney does during
trial is sufficient to defeat the claim. However, in order to preserve error for appeal,
an attorney is required to meet stringent standards. See, e.g., Boone v. State, Ind.

__,

449 N.E.2d 1077 (1983).

In Boone, the defendant, as part of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
claimed that his trial counsel erred in not objecting to potential bias of jurors who
had served on previous juries on similar charges. Boone v. State, 267 Ind. 493, 495,
371 N.E.2d 708, 709 (1978). However, trial counsel failed to preserve such an objection
for the record and the Supreme Court therefore deemed the issue waived. Id. However,
since the trial counsel failed to preserve the objection to the jury selection and failed
to have voir dire recorded, any prejudice is lost for appeal. Furthermore, the record
will only show that counsel was effective in what he did, not that he may have been
ineffective by not objecting to biased jurors. In the appeal from denial of post-conviction
relief, the defendant claimed that trial counsel attempted to preserve his error in not
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Judicial Integrity and Economy
The presumption of competence and the related policies are also
evidence that the courts tend to look on claims of ineffective assistance
with suspicion. There are several reasons behind the court's suspicion of ineffective assistance claims and their willingness to summarily
dismiss those claims. One apparent reason is the protection of the
integrity of the court system. By summarily affirming the trial court's
decision, the reviewing court is giving more credence to that lower
court's decision and perhaps deterring future claims by those convicted. In so doing, the reviewing court is attempting to avoid prolonged litigation of the same issue. By affirming convictions, the court
avoids beginning a new trial on an event long past which has already
been decided by a judicial tribunal.
Perhaps underlying the customary affirmation of convictions in
ineffectiveness claims is the court's tacit belief that the defendant is
guilty anyway." Should the reviewing court determine that counsel's
assistance was ineffective, the result is a new trial. But if the court
believes that the defendant is guilty anyway, it can avoid the problem of adding a new trial to an already overcrowded docket by declaring effective assistance and affirming the conviction. The Indiana
Supreme Court uses much of the rhetoric of the "mockery" standard
to avoid facing a substantive ineffective assistance claim.
The requirement that the defendant produce "strong and convincing" evidence to overcome the presumption of competence implies
the "guilty-anyway syndrome." Evidence of errors by counsel without
evidence of how those errors prejudiced the defendant is not enough
under Indiana's "mockery" standard. The court has already found the
defendant guilty and without further evidence, even if defense counsel
was incompetent, any other court will also find the defendant guilty.'
, 449 N.E.2d at
Ind. at _
objecting to the biased jurors but had failed. Boone 1079. The Supreme Court stated that such an allegation does not support a claim of
ineffective counsel because there is no showing of bias in the record. Id. However,
that is why trial counsel is ineffective.
The disparity of the standards creates a systemic gap wherein attorneys may
fall if they have not done enough to preserve an error for appeal but have done enough
to defeat an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Making the standards for ineffective claims more stringent by setting forth guidelines would create better representation by attorneys in that attorneys would preserve their action for the record in order
to show that guidelines were met. Thus, attorney's actions would be made a part of
the record and therefore diminish the gap between ineffective assistance claims and
preserving errors for appeal.
160. See Bazelon, supra note 1, at 26-28.
161. The Indiana Supreme Court has stated the underlying philosophy of the
presumption of competence:
The very best of lawyers are limited to working with their cases as they
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Certainly that logic evades the issue. If defense counsel evidences incompetence during trial, either through error, ignorance, mistake, or
failure to act, then the evidence produced and the examination of
witnesses at trial may have been incompetent also. A competent attorney may have produced a largely different result.' But Indiana,
by requiring the defendant to produce evidence as to what might have
happened, evades the problem. Such disregard for defendant's constitutional rights should not be tolerated. Courts are designed to protect constitutional rights, not to impose on them.
Another rationale for conclusive affirmation of criminal convictions in ineffective assistance claims is the court's belief that convicted
defendant's are using the courts as a playground to alleviate the
boredom of prison life." But, by treating ineffective claims so perfunctorily, the Indiana courts are playing a similar game. Many ineffective assistance claims may be frivolous and not worthy of judicial
scrutiny, but certainly some meritorious claims exist.' Because Indiana uses a standard of review which imposes a nearly unattainable
burden of proof, a meritorious claim may be joined with the frivolous
claims and summarily dismissed. Individual constitutional rights must
not be violated for the sake of the court's saving time by summarily
affirming what they feel might be frivolous claims. Alternative standards may provide one aspect of reform by which the Indiana courts
can preserve the constitutional rights of those accused of crimes.
find them. They cannot alter the facts. They cannot make unlawful acts
lawful. They cannot undo the crime. If the investigation was brief and
limited, perhaps it was because it, nevertheless, revealed that there was
no need to explore further. If no defense witnesses were called, perhaps
it was because there were none to call. If no plea of insanity was entered,
perhaps it was because the defendant was sane.
Kerns, 265 Ind. at 42-43, 349 N.E.2d at 703-04.
162. This is not to say that the end result should be the determining factor
in ineffective counsel claims. The court, although not explicitly stating so, recognized
this in Hollonquest, __ Ind. at -,
432 N.E.2d at 30. The court stated that failure
to mention the issue of trial counsel's inadequacy on direct appeal waived the issue.
However, the court allowed the defendant to raise the issue in his post-conviction
hearing because he also alleged the incompetence of his appellate counsel. In essence
the court is allowing the defendant to raise the issue because the alleged incompetence
of the appellate counsel may have been the factor in the negative result during appeal.
Id. at __,
432 N.E.2d at 39.
163. Diggs, 148 F.2d at 669-70 ("It is well known that the drafting of petitions
for habeas corpus has become a game in many penal institutions.").
164. Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit claimed that he came
upon walking violations of the sixth amendment week after week in the cases he
reviews. Bazelon, supra note 1, at 2. Chief Justice Burger has stated: "[F]rom onethird to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified
to render fully adequate representation." Burger, supra note 6, at 234.
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Alternative Standards
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged the right
to effective counsel when it determined that the sixth amendment
right to counsel meant "effective appointment"'" of counsel, not merely
pro forma appointment."' 6 The Supreme Court has not yet delineated
the scope of that sixth amendment right nor has it set any guidelines
by which to determine the effectiveness of counsel. In McMann v.
Richardson,"7 the Supreme Court did use language which departed
from the traditional due process concept of ineffective counsel when
it required that criminal defendant's lawyers act "within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."'6 8 But the
McMann language is still vague. Although stated in general terms,
the dictum does require stricter performance by an attorney than the
performance required by a "mockery" test.
As a result of the United States Supreme Court holding that
the sixth amendment requires effective assistance without setting
specific guidelines to determine effectiveness, there is much confusion in the courts as to the standard to apply in reviewing ineffectiveness of counsel claims. The result is a diversity of standards in
federal and state courts.' 9 Initially, the standard applied was the
"mockery of justice" standard similar to the one presently applied
in Indiana. 70 In light of the evolution of the sixth amendment right
and the realization that the "mockery" test alone is inadequate, many
jurisdictions have turned from the subjective "mockery" test to a more
objective approach. The federal circuits have all but abandoned the
"mockery" test in favor of standards addressing the quality of
representation rather than the quality of the trial.'
The Supreme Court has not established any specific guidelines
in determining what constitutes ineffective counsel. Consequently, the
courts are setting their own standards. The District of Columbia'72
165. Powell, 287 U.S. at 76.
166. Id. at 71-72.
167. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
168. Id. at 771.
169. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
170. Diggs, 148 F.2d at 667. Most federal circuit courts applied similar "mockery"
standards until the Supreme Court's recognition in McMann of the right to effective
counsel as a sixth amendment guarantee. The McMann holding precipitated a movement towards implementation of standards which adequately protect that right.
171. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also Note, Effective Assistance

of Counsel, supra note 1.
172. See Bazelon, supra note 1. See also DeCoster, 624 F.2d at 209-14 (setting
out specific guidelines for duties which attorneys must follow).
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and the Fourth Circuit 7 ' are leaders in establishing standards to
safeguard the sixth amendment right to effective counsel. The Fourth
Circuit employs a standard which sets specific guidelines which an
attorney must meet. These guidelines are essentially derived from
the ABA standards for the defense function.1 5 Like the Fourth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit employs the "guidelines" approach set out in the ABA standards.' These guidelines include a
duty to: confer with the defendant as often as necessary, discuss potential strategy and tactical choices, advise and protect defendant's rights,
conduct pre-trial examinations and, conduct legal and factual
investigation.'77 These basic guidelines, although open to interpretation, set specific duties which will aid attorneys and defendants in
determining what the sixth amendment requires.
The "guidelines approach" sets out specific duties which an
attorney must perform or he is presumed to be ineffective. The
"guidelines approach" directly conflicts with the presumption of competence found in Indiana's "mockery" test. In the "guidelines approach," the duties imposed on the attorney are duties which are
among the range of competence of attorney conduct. 7 ' The breach
of any one of the duties carries with it a presumption of ineffectiveness
which then shifts the burden of proof to the state, requiring the state
to prove that the breach caused no prejudice to the defendant." This
step alleviates the great burden put on the criminal defendant laboring to prove ineffectiveness under Indiana's "mockery" standard.
The "mockery" standard, as applied in the Indiana courts, is applied in a different manner than the "mockery" test applied by the
Seventh Circuit. The Indiana Supreme Court still implements the traditional "mockery" standard, even though modified by "adequate legal

173. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
174. The specific duties required of an attorney are: Confer with the client
early and as often as necessary, advise him of his rights, ascertain all defenses that
may be available and develop all appropriate defenses, conduct all necessary investigations, allow time for reflection and preparation. Id. at 226.
175. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. (App. Draft 1971).
176. DeCoster, 624 F.2d at 209-14.
177. Id. at 201-214.
178. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
179. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197. The court still retains discretion in some part.
The breach of duty must be a "substantial" breach which the court has the discretion
to determine. "If a defendant shows a substantial violation of any of these requirements
he has been denied effective representation unless the government, 'on which is cast
the burden of proof . . .can establish lack of any prejudice thereby.'" Id. at 1204.
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representation," while the Seventh Circuit employs a "mockery" standard modified by "legal assistance which meets a minimum standard
of professional representation.""' The result is confusion on the part
of attorneys as to what standard of performance is required. Cases
involving ineffective counsel claims which are decided by the Indiana
state courts may be reviewed by the Seventh Circuit through the
habeas corpus procedural mechanism. Because the Indiana courts and
the Seventh Circuit apply different tests in employing the "mockery"
standard, a different result may be reached on the same facts.'8 ' This
divergence serves to exacerbate the confusion as to the standard of
performance required by defense attorneys in criminal cases.
The Seventh Circuit has enacted an approach, although not
expressly rejecting the "mockery" test, which requires "legal
assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional
representation."''
The Seventh Circuit has thus broadened the
"mockery" test."s The court examines each allegation of incompetence
individually and then collectively, recognizing that the inquiry goes
beyond whether the trial was a sham or a mockery." The Seventh
Circuit's approach, although setting no guidelines, uses a sixth amendment examination of counsel's actions to see if the actions reach a
minimum standard. Unlike Indiana's "mockery" test, the minimal standard approach assures protection of the constitutional right to effective counsel because it requires the court to examine the quality of
the representation, not solely the quality of the trial. The sixth amendment demands that counsel, not the trial, be effective.

180. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).
181. The Seventh Circuit has heard cases involving ineffective counsel claims
via the habeas corpus procedural mechanism and reversed a state court's holding. In
Wade v. Franzen, 678 F,2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois
state court applied the "wrong standard." The Illinois court had distinguished between
an appointed and retained counsel. However, the Seventh Circuit court concluded that
the distinction did not matter because the state court applied a "mockery" type standard instead of the "minimal professional competence" standard employed by the
Seventh Circuit. Id. at 58.
Such a result could easily be reached when a case involving a claim of ineffective counsel decided by an Indiana court under a "mockery" standard of review reaches
the circuit court, According to the Seventh Circuit, the "farce or sham" standard
(synonyms of the "mockery" standard) is the wrong legal standard of review in ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id.
182. Twomey, 510 F.2d at 641.
183. Id. at 641 ("On this appeal we have broadened the rule.").
184. The examination of trial counsel's actions will necessarily involve aspects
of the trial. But it is not the trial or counsel which is the focus of the issue. It is
the defendant's constitutional rights which receive the emphasis.
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The Indiana Supreme Court's employment of the "mockery" standard of review in ineffective assistance of counsel claims includes
pragmatic concerns. The court uses the rhetoric of the "mockery" standard in furtherance of those concerns. The court places great emphasis
on the presumption of competence of trial attorneys in order to avoid
confronting the merits of an ineffective counsel claim. Consequently,
a defendant alleging ineffectiveness of counsel is required to produce
strong evidence to bolster allegations of attorney incompetence.
Furthermore, little credence is given to that evidence unless substantially supported. The court also defers to the trial attorney's strategy
as a means of evading a direct confrontation of the ineffective counsel
issue. The "mockery" standard is vague and allows the court to avoid
the merits of ineffectiveness claims. Standards which implement the
"guidelines approach" or set minimum standards would better aid attorneys, judges, and defendants in evaluating the quality of attorney
representation.
Judicial Duty
The Indiana courts appear to allow inept actions by defense
counsel." 5 The Indiana Supreme Court has allowed controversial
actions by defense counsel and has rationalized the decisions by claiming that such actions aid the court in carrying out its busy schedule."
But the court should not allow attorneys to refrain from actions
necessary for constitutionally adequate representation merely for the
benefit of the court. To do so raises judicial economy over the constitutional rights of the accused. 8 '
One method of reform of the ineffectiveness issue mentioned by
the United States Supreme Court in McMann,' but often overlooked, is a directive to trial judges. The court mandated that "judges
should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who represent defendants in criminal cases in their courts.""'
This statement implicitly imposes a duty on trial judges to insure
that defense counsel does not violate defendant's constitutional rights.

185.

See Leaver, -

Ind. __, 414 N.E.2d 959; Crisp, 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d

115.
186. Crisp,at 537, 394 N.E.2d at 119. "[A] distinction between an exceptionally
careful defense lawyer and a defense lawyer who may in part conform to trial court
practice in carrying out the administration of a busy court."
187. 397 U.S. 759. The system is designed to protect the constitutional rights
at issue here. The courts must not take priority over constitutional rights.
188. Id. at 771.
189. Id.
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Trial judges should prevent incompetence or correct inadequacies when
they arise. 9 ' This policy has been neither cited often nor given much
emphasis, but it has been recognized as imposing a duty on the trial
judges to insure the protection of the accused's right to effective
counsel.' The policy is a valid method of preventing constitutionally
defective representation. Courts are designed to promote justice and
protect rights. These ends cannot be achieved if the trial judge condones attorney incompetence. If the judge becomes cognizant of an
attorney's inadequacy it is imperative that action is taken to prevent
it. The rationalization that the defendant has other remedies available
through appeal or post-conviction relief does not resolve the issue.
The fundamental right to liberty requires that no one be deprived
of that liberty in contravention of constitutional rights. The trial judge,
if he recognizes ineffective assistance and fails to rectify the situation is allowing the defendant's constitutional rights to be violated.
The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that there is a duty
on the part of the trial judge to prevent ineffective assistance by
defense counsel. This duty was recognized in Wilson v. State9' where
the court found that defense counsel provided incompetent representation and reversed the conviction. In reviewing the trial attorney's
actions, the court noted that defense counsel failed to produce a
witness who would corroborate the defendant's alibi. The defendant
moved for a recess to gather information needed to substantiate his
alibi. The court granted a two-hour recess; a wholly insufficient time
to do the necessary work. The reviewing court concluded: "The failure
to have Martin [the witness] present is attributable in the first instance to appellant's lawyer, but having recognized appellant's need
for time, the judge himself is responsible for the inadequacy of the
190. That is not to say that judges should become advocates but that if they
see apparent inadequate representation they should intervene. Either a recess or continuance could be granted so counsel could better prepare. Cognizance of such a duty
on the part of the trial judges would do much to eliminate claims of ineffective assistance
later on. The short term effect may be to initially bog down an already overcrowded
court docket, but the long term effect may be a greater efficiency. Attorney's would
be more careful in their preparation and handling of cases thereby possibly eliminating
future claims of ineffectiveness. The motivational factor would be the fear of reprimand by the court. Judge Bazelon pointed out eight substantial errors made by defense
counsel in United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Judge Bazelon's
words: "When the newspapers reported the case, the big news was not the attorney's
inadequacy but rather the fact that a judge had mentioned it." Bazelon supra note
1 at 25. If more judges conformed to this practice, the news would reflect the inadequacies of the attorney rather than the judge's action in mentioning it.
191. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
192. 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1945).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 6
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

remedy. 1' 93 The court went even further: "A fair-minded judge
observing the incompetency of an attorney for the defense would be
expected to take more than ordinary care to protect the rights of
the accused."'" This imposes a duty on the trial judge, but it has never
been given the import it deserves.
Judges should take an active role in deterring and correcting
instances of ineffective counsel as the Indiana and United States
Supreme Courts have suggested. If the judge sees that counsel is inadequately prepared, then a continuance should be granted. If counsel
is incompetent and a continuance would appear to be fruitless, then
new counsel should be appointed. A trial judge who watches while
constitutional rights are infringed, merely because of crowded dockets,
is in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 9 '
The "mockery" standard as applied by the Indiana Supreme
Court does not protect the right to effective counsel and requires
reform. A "guidelines" approach will give attorneys and defendants
specific duties by which the trial representation can be judged. These
guidelines will provide specific goals which attorneys must meet and
will aid in eliminating future inadequacies by attorneys. A new standard with concrete application will help preserve the constitutional
rights of those accused of crime.
CONCLUSION

The Indiana Supreme Court is applying an outdated and inadequate standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The "mockery of justice" test as applied in Indiana is totally inadequate to insure that criminal defendants receive the constitutionally
guaranteed right to effective counsel as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court. The "adequate legal representation" modification is an appropriate step, but not until it is given full weight will
it have an effect. To give the modification full weight the Indiana
courts must either change the applicable standard or change the meaning of "mockery of justice." To guarantee the right to effective counsel,
the Indiana courts must look at the representation qua representation and not solely in the context of the total trial.
An approach much like the "guidelines" standard set out in the
193. Id. at 73, 51 N.E.2d at 852.
194. Id. at 82, 51 N.E.2d at 855-56.
195. If counsel is retained, then there are additional problems with the judiciary
appointing new counsel for the defendant. Such an issue is outside the scope of this
note. See supra note 101.
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ABA standard for the defense function will insure that the right to
effective counsel is protected. Specific guidelines would give reviewing courts the ability to judge attorney representation by definable
standards. Guidelines would also allow attorneys to judge their performances and remedy obvious deficiencies. The existence of
recognizable standards will encourage better, more diligent
representation.
Until the United States Supreme Court sets out a workable interpretation of effective counsel there will be varying standards. But
the existence of varying standards is no excuse for an inadequate and
unjust standard. The "mockery of justice" standard as applied in Indiana does not meet the requirements of the Indiana or United States
Constitutions in assuring effective counsel. The adoption of a viable
and fair standard is a necessity which demands a quick resolution
in order to protect constitutional rights the courts were designed to
protect. In the interim, trial judges must take an active role in preventing attorney incompetence. It is the duty of the judge to conduct
a trial which provides the justice for which courts were created. To
allow attorney incompetence is to obviate that duty and violate the
accused's constitutional right to effective counsel, a right which must
be adequately protected.
TIMOTHY R. NEWHOUSE
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